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TIMING IS
EVERYTHING?
Jordan Alexander Stein
Periodization and Sovereignty:
How Ideas of Feudalism and
Secularization Govern the Politics
of Time by Kathleen Davis.
Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2008. Pp. 208.
$42.50 cloth.

To be blunt: everyone should read
this book. There are at least two
reasons I think so. The first is the
sheer intellectual pleasure to be had
in grappling with its challenging
and complex argument. The second
is the exciting way the book models
the kind of comparative, cross-field,
interdisciplinary projects that everyone values but that few of us are
trained to do. Most clearly spanning
medieval studies and postcolonial
studies (themselves internally rather
diversified fields), Periodization and
Sovereignty has an audience with
anyone, in any field, who wishes to
think seriously about time, politics,
or history.
The relationship among Periodization and Sovereignty’s keywords
is avowedly circular. In most basic
terms, the book argues that “the
history of periodization is juridical,
and it advances through struggle over
the definition and location of sovereignty” (6, original emphasis). The
reciprocal relation between these
two concepts is demonstrated in
two parts, titled “Feudalism” and
“Secularization,” each consisting of
a pair of chapters. Rather than providing a genealogy of these terms,
the book demonstrates the extent
to which they have been continually interarticulated in deployment
and theorization, such that “secularism appeared in relation to feudalism through sovereignty,” and
“the relation of secularization and
sovereignty is also key to historical debates over periodization—
particularly with respect to the idea
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of ‘modernity’ as an independent,
self-constituting period. Coming
full circle, theories of modernity rely
upon the legitimacy of secularization to shore up the period divide”
(6–7). Periodization and Sovereignty
makes its case through an impressive range of texts and thinkers,
including detailed engagements
with the Venerable Bede, William
Blackstone, Jean Bodin, Charles Du
Moulin, Johannes Fabian, Amitav
Ghosh, G. W. F. Hegel, François
Hotman, Karl Löwith, and Carl
Schmitt.
As the book’s central intervention is historiographic, it initially
gives analytical priority to periodization, which, it argues, “results
from a double movement: the first,
a contestatory process of identification with an epoch, the categories
of which it simultaneously constitutes” and “the second a rejection
of that epoch identified in this
reduced, condensed form” (30–31,
original emphasis). The chief example is the period divide between
modernity and the Middle Ages,
the latter supposed to be feudal and
the former supposed to have progressed past a feudal order. The
book shows, however, that feudalism was first theorized in (what is
now called) the late Renaissance,
and that the word comes to English
(an invention, packaged as a discovery) from its revival in French
thought on the eve of the 1789 revolution. As the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries witnessed the
rise and expansion of a transnational

slave trade, the association in these
centuries of a “feudal Middle Ages”
with more barbaric, determinedly
premodern forms of government
seems a disavowal at best.
Yet Periodization and Sovereignty refuses to rely on any simple
notion of causation or conspiracy
that might be encoded in a conceptual operation like disavowal.
Though certainly not immune to
empirical evidence, the book treats
the idea of history as an intellectual
problem, drawing variously on a
notion of doubling (e.g., “double
movement” [30, 124], “redoubl[ing]”
[85], “double bind” [116]), which
suggests a conceptual debt to deconstruction, and on a notion of
discursive power, which suggests
not only Foucault and de Certeau
but also other medievalist scholars
(Kathleen Biddick, Carolyn Dinshaw, Bruce Holsinger) who have
in different ways explored the tropic
deployment of medievalism. The
book’s predominant mode of argumentation is critical—exposing and
explicating the problematic political logics behind familiar and
widely used theoretical and historiographic concepts. Yet, the point
is never to discover what the “real”
history is or who is right or wrong.
Rather, Periodization and Sovereignty
shows how and when the concepts
it tracks come into play, arguing
that they always do so simultaneously, in a circular fashion.
The sheer range of examples in
a book that refuses to simply be a
genealogy does, however, offer some
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glimpses as to what a constructive
(rather than strictly critical) orientation to the book’s central problems might be. Of particular note
here is chapter 4, which stages
an extended engagement between
Bede’s fourth-century De temporum
ratione and Ghosh’s 1994 monograph In an Antique Land. The
juxtaposition of these texts about
periodization has the intriguing
effect of making periodization into
a topic to be analyzed rather than
an organizing logic that would
itself govern analyses. If, however,
this chapter is be a methodological
model, that point remains unemphasized (though the author makes
clear that this chapter is “more
meditation than argument” [103]).
Tonally similar moments appear at
the closing of chapters; for example, chapter 3 ends with a gesture
toward “the difference between
the sovereign cut of periodization
and the abeyance of that sovereign
closure” (102), and the book itself
ends with the brazen hope that
“periodization must come undone”
(134). The idea that an abeyance or
an undoing of periodization might
disrupt the logics of sovereign
power is intriguing, to say the least.
Yet, the fact that these hopeful
moments of alternative possibility
open up at the argument’s close
leaves some of the most tantalizing
implications of the book regrettably unexplored.
Though a brilliant and exciting
account of periodization and sovereignty, the argument feels most
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significantly limited in its treatment of secularization, used most
often as a synonym for progress.
While this is the sense of the word
used by the likes of Max Weber,
Löwith, and Hans Blumenberg (in
debates discussed at length on
pages 83–89), the book’s treatment
of secularization seems largely to
work apart from the current multidisciplinary retheorization of this
concept, for example in the work
of Talal Asad, Charles Taylor, or
Michael Warner. This omission is
also odd given the detailed ways
in which the book engages contemporary theorists of sovereignty
with whom it appears to agree,
such as Giorgio Agamben. In this
sense, there is a certain asymmetry
in the treatment of the book’s
keywords, resulting (surprisingly)
in more compelling connections
between periodization and feudalism than between sovereignty and
secularization.
Nonetheless, if the book does
not develop all its implications, it
should garner a wide enough audience that their development will
come at other hands. Indeed, this
impressively distilled little book
has impressively large implications
for nearly any field of literary
scholarship concerned with liberalism, temporality, or historicity—or
with the chronological periods that
so often structure the boundaries
of fields themselves.
—University of Colorado
at Boulder

